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The topic of the panel, the topic of the summit – the
role of the state – and this panel the role of subsidiar-
ity is extremely timely, obviously, both for Europe and
the United States. Both the European Union and the
United States are in a state of crisis right now. The cri-
sis has different features in our two zones, and
analysing it – contrasting the features of the US fiscal
system and role of the state and the counterpart in the
European Union – is, I think, extremely helpful. In
the United States we are facing a chronic budget crisis
and an undersupply of public goods. Europe is facing
a crisis of a starkly divided Europe and the inadequa-
cy, in some ways, of the European-level institutions to
address that sharp division.
So let me turn first to the United States and offer some
brief thoughts. The United States right now is in a cri-
sis of the state. In my view a crisis of chronic under-
supply of public goods – infrastructure, education,
healthcare, help for the poor, help and financing even
for diplomatic and international development initia-
tives – and that undersupply of public goods is creat-
ing a certain kind of rot in the US economy and soci-
ety right now. We are not supplying the public goods
to narrow income inequalities, to help the poor escape
from the cycle of poverty, to ensure an adequate level
of healthcare, education, family care or day care for
young children that the normal high-income society
would produce. The United States has become more
unequal in income and wealth than at any time in US
history. The redistribution of income from the super-
rich to the working class poor is very limited right now,
and there are extremely stark ideological divides and
differences of opinion about what to do. 
I would put it this way: the United States is essential-
ly the lowest tax revenue country within the high-
income world, within the OECD high-income coun-
tries, when you measure tax revenues as a share of
gross domestic product. The United States, including
federal, state and local government revenues, is now
collecting about 31/32 percent of GDP in revenues,
even significantly less this year because of the busi-
ness cycle. And that is far below the European average
of 40 percent of GDP, and, of course, far, far below
the levels of northern Europe, which reach nearly
50 percent of GDP or even higher in some countries.
The United States is chronically, from a social, ideo-
logical, political-organisational point of view, an anti-
tax society – the whole country was born in an anti-
tax rebellion – and US federal tax paid as a share of
national income has been fairly constant, about
18 percent of GDP over nearly half a century. State
and local taxation has risen gradually and very mod-
estly to perhaps 10 or 12 percent of GDP, leading 
to this overall level of roughly 30 percent of GDP in
tax take. 
We cannot run our society at this level but the public
does not really know it, unfortunately. Our federal
taxes are completely eaten up by the military budget,
Medicare and Medicaid in health, Social Security,
and interest payments on the debt. All the rest of gov-
ernment at the federal level, whether it is infrastruc-
ture, education, energy, agriculture, diplomacy, inter-
national assistance – that is all on borrowed money
now because we don’t raise enough revenues actually
to run our government. Yet politically the Republican
Party is essentially 100 percent organised around fur-
ther tax cuts. The Democrats are more or less organ-
ised around holding things where they are, and almost
no one is telling the truth to the American people that
you cannot run a modern society at 30 percent of
GDP in total revenues. That is the American crisis. In
terms of the division of those revenues, the federal
government is collecting, as I said, about 18 percent of
GDP and the state and local governments about
12 percent of GDP in revenues. So they are divided
roughly two-thirds at the federal level and one-third at
the state and local level. I think, from a division point
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more at the federal level, because the states themselves
are engaged in a race to the bottom right now, where
they are each trying to cut their taxes to try to attract
business from their next-door neighbours. That kind
of race to the bottom is, of course, a classic prisoner’s
dilemma where each of our state-level government
decision-makers is operating in a game that is leading
to a loss of revenues for all of the states and inade-
quacy of public goods provision that is being exacer-
bated by that race to the bottom.
Now the US system from a subsidiarity point of view
has the fairly desirable feature that first there is lots of
mobility within the country and there is a fair amount
of redistribution of income through the federal tax
system – partly it is direct taxation at the federal level
that is directly redistributed to state and local govern-
ments in programs like Medicaid, part of it is the play
of automatic stabilisers, where when one part of our
country has an economic decline its tax burden goes
down automatically while the receipts of federal mon-
eys go up in unemployment compensation and so
forth. So we have a fairly good internal redistribution
system both through migration and the fiscal system,
but the crisis is that the overall level of public revenues
is chronically too low and the American society, in my
view, is sinking as a result of this. We are simply los-
ing the bottom half of the population, which is not
getting the healthcare, the skills, the infrastructure
and the environmental safety it needs. And the whole
world is paying a price when the United States is
unwilling to invest in sustainable energy and climate
change, in global poverty reduction and so on. 
On the European side, at least my view looking from
outside in, is that the overall levels of taxation – aver-
aging about 40 percent of GDP and going up to about
50 percent of GDP – are far better than the United
States. I don’t think Europe is overtaxed, despite the
usual assumption. I think the United States is under-
taxed, and I hope Europe preserves its tax base.
Europe’s problem, it seems to me, if you compare it to
the US system, is that Europe collects all its taxes at
national, state and local levels and very little at the
European-wide level through the assessments to the
European Union. So if you take the EU or the euro
area as the analogy to the US federal level, then the
EU has a budget of about 1 percent of the gross prod-
uct of the EU, I understand, and that means in effect
there is no significant collection at the European-wide
space. And I think Europe pays a price for this, quite
predictably. When the euro was established, some-
thing I strongly supported then and continue to sup-
port now and believe in, I published a paper at the
time that said Europe is obviously not an optimum
currency area, even though it is interconnected eco-
nomically. Migration levels are rather modest and fis-
cal policy is national, not European-wide. There are
not automatic stabilisers European-wide; there are
not cross-country transfers European-wide; there is
no mechanism for bank bailouts European-wide. And
of course Europe is living through that drama right
now. It does not really have an effective response
today to Portugal, Greece, Ireland – Spain to some
extent, although I am more optimistic about Spain. 
When a part of Europe, especially the southern tier or
Ireland, gets into a deep crisis, this is borne entirely –
I think it is fair to say – at the national level. The most
Europe has done is to give some fairly short-term
loans. But there is no fiscal remedy, and migration,
which of course should be a part of the solution,
exists but is rather moderate. So my take on the
European side, simply put, is that the overall level of
taxation is much smarter than in the United States
because Europe can run a civilised economy, one that
has social security, one that makes transfers to the
poor, one that ensures coverage of healthcare, one
that ensures better quality of public education and
more access to higher education, one that actually
delivers more social mobility in Europe than in the
United States these days according to all of the
OECD findings. So don’t slash taxes for the US liber-
al model. We don’t provide the public goods we need
to hold our society together. But do find a way, in my
opinion, to bolster the role of the fiscal system at the
European-wide level so that there can be more auto-
matic stabilisers, more cross-country transfers and
more ways to resolve these sharp crises that arise
when the poorer and more vulnerable regions of
Europe fall into crisis, even as the heart of the
European economy, especially Germany and northern
Europe, are doing quite well. It’s kind of a conver-
gence argument in a way. 
I’d like to see the United States be more like Europe,
especially more like northern Europe, and I’d like to
see Europe be a bit more like the United States of
Europe – the famous idea – in terms of acting like a
somewhat more unified fiscal space to go along with
the unified monetary area and the unified single mar-
ket. I am a huge fan of what Europe has accom-
plished. I think it is the best model of regional inte-
gration in modern history and for the world. And I
think it needs to continue to be in the forefront and
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opinion would bolster the great results that Europe
has achieved in its modern history. So continue to be
a role model for us in the United States. Eventually we
will learn something about being civil even to our
poor people, and we will learn that taxes are not the
bane of civilisation but the key to it. And I hope that
together then the North Atlantic can be a dynamic
role model for the rest of the world economy rather
than two regions holding on for dear life as we watch
China and India and others soar.
PANEL
John Peet of The Economist chaired the third panel
and started by drawing two conclusions from the con-
ference thus far: (1) the size of the state is probably
too large but because of demographic pressure it will
not be possible to shrink it very much, perhaps only to
40–45 percent of GDP; and (2) Europe has a very low
productivity growth which underscores the impor-
tance of making our public and our services sectors
more productive. 
The first panel speaker was Norbert Reithofer, CEO of
the BMW Group, who stressed the role of govern-
ments in ensuring that “we have the freest possible
markets with few trade barriers and world-wide fair
competition on a level playing field”. Promoting new
technologies, such as e-mobility, is an important joint
task of government and business. 
In the opinion of Dennis M. Nally, Chairmann of
PWC International in New York, “we all have an
interest in making sure that free-market capitalism
works properly”. Despite the different models, we all
share one core assumption: “the private sector and
not the state must be the primary engine for econom-
ic expansion”. Many issues, like trade, currency,
financial crime and the climate, can only be dealt with
at the international level. These issues should be
addressed not only by governments but also by busi-
nesses: “business has to maintain a more central role
in sustaining the market system and improving its per-
formance in society as well”. 
The problems of the banking sector in Britain were
described by Lord Oakeshott of Seagrove Bay, Liberal
Democrat Member of the House of Lords. Making
banks safe is vital for the future of the British and
European economies. The banking system in Britain
is so large “that it dwarfs the rest of the economy. To
compete with New York, Frankfurt and Zurich,
Britain unfortunately ended up with a ‘light touch
regulation’ of the banking sector”. Britain now has a
very distorted economy with a huge financial and a
small manufacturing sector. It is the job of the state to
curb the power of the banks.
Rolf Alter, Director for Public Governance and
Territorial Development of the OECD, asked whether
we have taken advantage of the crisis to re-establish
the balance between government and markets. We
need to look not only at government size but also at
its quality, which is a matter of how government inter-
acts with citizens and with business. Europe also
needs to look beyond its borders, especially at the dra-
matic developments in North Africa and the Middle
East. In terms of government quality, the OECD with
its 34 member countries strives to be a ‘club of good
policy practices’. 
The last panel commentator, former German MP
Friedrich Merz, stressed that our problems need to be
solved at the European level. The EU Internal Market
has been a great success, with the EMU as the next
logical step. The promise of a stable currency has been
kept, but the promise of a political union is still out-
standing, and it is precisely the current crisis that is
showing is the ‘lack of political integration in
Europe’. There are consequences of this deficiency.
(1) ESM will only buy time, in which a ‘restructuring
mechanism’ for states in the EU must be devised.
(2) Competitiveness must be improved, but within a
Europe with a stronger political union. 
In the discussion, Mr. Peet asked about the accep-
tance of a ‘transfer union’ in Germany. Friedrich
Merz replied that Germany has benefitted from EU
developments in the past twenty years. Since much of
Germany’s wealth depends on the euro, it is obliged to
help the troubled countries. This requires a sort of
transfer union in Europe, which must be properly con-
structed. Hans-Werner Sinn replied that it is a ‘false
assessment’ to say that Germany gained most from
the euro. The euro has helped Europe in general
including Germany, but under the euro capital flowed
out of the country into the European periphery,
“while Germany had the lowest net investment share
in GDP among all OECD countries”. This retarded
growth in Germany led to mass unemployment and to
a real economic depression. The domestic economy
stagnated, which necessitated the Schroeder reforms.
It is ‘a big mistake’ to interpret the export surpluses as
a gain for Germany. In response, Mr. Merz pointed toCESifo Forum 3/2011 43
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the strong growth in Germany in 2010 after unit
labour costs had been reduced. Germany is still one of
the countries that is “benefitting from the European
development economically and politically the most”.
What is important is to make the EU more competi-
tive as a whole, not just individual countries. For
Europe, the question is one of global competitiveness,
and Germany is only one part. Mr. Reithofer added
that “to be a strong global player, you need a strong
home market” and for his company Europe is the
home market because of the single market reforms.
Having the euro also helped his company to master
the crisis. Rolf Alter stressed that taking a national
approach is no longer adequate. We cannot “pursue
policies at the level of nation states when the markets
are so heavily integrated”. Since the most integrated
markets are financial markets, the response to them is
hardly to be found at the national level. Elmar Brok
pointed out that Europeans cooperating with the
Americans would be able to set standards in the finan-
cial world; the nation state is too small for this. The
EU can only survive if all member states see it as a
win-win situation, which means that the weaker states
must be helped under the condition that they put their
houses in order.
Anatole Kaletsky observed that there is an unneces-
sary confusion between two financial crises. There is a
sovereign debt crisis in Greece due to incompetent
and even dishonest management of the government.
In Ireland and Spain, however, it is not a sovereign
debt crisis but is all about the banking sector. The
problem is that we have a single market in European
banking but a national system of regulation and guar-
antees for these banks. “We need a euro-wide system
of recapitalising, guaranteeing and regulating the
banks”. Friedrich Merz agreed and added that the
critical point is what competencies should be trans-
ferred to the European level and which ones should be
left at the national level. A strong European Com  -
mission should make this clear. Social security and
health care should remain national competencies, but
others such as banking regulations or capital require-
ments cannot be left at the national level. The preven-
tive control of deficits and debt is needed at the
European level as a way to avoid crises. Lord
Oakeshott made the observation that Ireland was a
state that was controlled by its banks. Banking regu-
lations at a European level are not realistic until the
British banking system is reformed. Rainer Brüderle
stressed that a common market requires common
rules. On the other hand, we have very strong compe-
tition in the financial markets between New York,
London and the continental financial centres.
London has its own ideas, especially with regard to
the financial transaction tax. “We have nearly over-
come the financial crisis, but we have no new rules”.
At the G20 meeting in Korea, for example, there were
very few common ideas. “And I do not think we will
have enormous progress in the coming years. That is
the risk for the next crisis. Without a minimum of
common rules we will have another crisis”. 